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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for wrongful death. The court decided she could by reasoning
that a minor emancipated by marriage or otherwise may cer-
tainly compromise a claim for money if he or she may alienate
his or her movables. The writer submits that a compromise is
not an alienation, or transfer for value in return, but a disposi-
tion, or transfer not necessarily for value. Nevertheless, the de-
cision is correct, for under the Civil Code the emancipated minor
not only may alienate his movables, but may also dispose of them
otherwise than by way of donation inter vivos.3 3
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
WATER BOTTOMS
An interesting discussion of the difference in the application
of California Co. v. Price' and Miami Corp. v. State2 appears
in the new case of State v. Scott.3 It involved the ownership of
a submerged area of land which was within the description of
an 1883 patent, and which is now part of the bed of the Gulf
of Mexico. As stated by the court: "If the land described in the
patent was under water at the time of the issuance of patent
then this case would come under the Price case, supra. However,
if it were marsh land subject to overflow as set out in the patent
and survey then it would come under the case of Miami Corpora-
tion v. State, supra.' '4 The majority of the court adopted the
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 365(1,2), 366, 367, and 379 construed in light of 382.
Persons who are majors although under twenty-one are (1) those over eighteen
relieved of "the time prescribed by law for attaining the age of majority" and
(2) married persons over eighteen. See id. arts. 382, 385 as interpreted in
light of the title to section 4 of the chapter on emancipation. A late decision not
otherwise mentioned in this Symposium, Speziale v. Kohnke, 194 So. 2d 485 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967), made the error of confusing the major under article 385 with
an emancipated minor.
33. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 373 forbids the emancipated minor to "alienate,
affect, or mortgage his immovables" except by following certain procedures, and
article 374 forbids him "to dispose by donation inter vivos" except in one instance.
Thus the inference must be that the emancipated minor may "alienate, affect, or
mortgage" his movables absolutely (subject, of course, to the remedy for simple
lesion) and "dispose" of them otherwise than by donation inter vivos.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 225 La. 706, 74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
2. 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936).
3. 185 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 485, 187
So. 2d 450, 451 (1966).
4. 185 So. 2d at 882.
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stipulation of the parties that "the area in litigation had been
washed away and had subsided, and had been covered by water
for more than six years before the present suit was filed."5
Consequently, the Price case was inapposite, and the Miami case
was applied decreeing ownership in the state. In the opinion of
the dissenting judge, 6 it had not been established that the area
had been exposed land in 1883, and therefore he deemed that
the situation was covered by the Price case.
Actually, the Miami case involved a "lake" although the
language of the opinion extends comprehensively to other kinds
of navigable bodies of water. Giving direct application of the
Miami case to the "sea," without any discussion or other au-
thority, is regrettable. No reference is made to Civil Code article
450 concerning the sea and its shores, nor to R.S. 49:3 proclaim-
ing the state ownership of the waters and bed and shores of the
Gulf of Mexico. 7
LEVEE SERVITUDE
Civil Code article 6658 imposes on riparian properties a servi-
tude for making and repairing levees. This has been extended
to include levees constructed inland from the actual riparian
property where such levees constitute part of a more compre-
hensive flood control program.9 The justification of the original
servitude, as an appropriation which does not violate due
process, rests on the historical fact that the original grants were
gratuitous and the servitude burden was not unreasonable.'0
The case of Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Board of
Commissioners for the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District" estab-
lishes for the first time a new and important aspect of this levee
servitude. The original riparian grants were generally long
narrow tracts of land with a relatively small frontage on the
5. Id. at 884.
6. Id. at 886.
7. See YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 27, 28 (1966).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 665 (1870): "Servitude imposed for the public or
common utility, relate to the space which is to be left for the public use by the
adjacent proprietors on the shores of navigable rivers, and for the making and
repairing of levees, roads and other public or common works.
"All that relates to this kind of servitude is determined by laws or particular
regulations."
9. LA. R.S. 38:81 et seq. (1950); Dickson v. Board of Commissioners of
Caddo Levee Dist., 210 La. 121, 26 So. 2d 474 (1946).
10. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
11. 249 La. 508, So. 2d 715 (1966), noted 27 LA. L. REV. 321 (1967).
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river. With the passage of time and the availability of other
modes of access and transportation, these tracts became sub-
divided and parts united in various combinations, but these
transactions did not affect or alter the levee servitude.
1 2
The significance of the instant case of first impression is
that while the levee servitude continues to rest upon any pres-
ently non-riparian property which was once a part of an original
riparian tract, it does not exist upon a presently non-riparian
property which was never part of an original riparian grant.
A levee district, which finds it necessary to have such areas for
the construction of levees as part of a flood control program,
can of course exercise the right of eminent domain to obtain
them, but in this event the compensation required is market
value instead of the previous year's assessed value. The dis-
tinction made in the principal case is legally and historically
sound, but whether it is in the best interests of society at large
is another matter. 18
SIC UTERE SERVITUDE
The case of Hamilton v. City of Shreveport,14 after a series
of vicissitudes of litigation, established that the Civil Code ar-
ticles 660 and 66715 on servitudes are applicable against munici-
palities, and that in the event of the violation of these servitudes
there is absolute liability without the need to find any fault.
However, in reference to the legal nature of this liability, a
certain ambivalence of ideas creeps into the discussion, because
in addition to identifying the servitude as a property limitation
imposed by law there is also mentioned the tort idea that viola-
tion of the duty in article 667 constitutes "fault" under article
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 656 (1870). It would have been inappropriate to
apply Civil Code articles 783(1) and 784 because dividing up the boundaries of
the property could not properly be considered the same as physical changes or
destruction which extinguish the servitude.
13. See Note, 27 LA. L. REV. 321 (1967).
14. 180 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), writ refused, 248 La. 700, 181
So.2d 399 (1966).
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 660 (1870): "It is a servitude due by the estate
situated below to receive the waters which run naturally from the estate situated
above, provided the industry of man has not been used to create that servitude.
"The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to make any other
work, to prevent this running of the water.
"The proprietor above can do nothing whereby the natural servitude due by
the estate below may be rendered more burdensome."
"Art. 667. Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases,
still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the lib-
erty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
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2315.16 If a suit was promptly instituted, the successful plain-
tiff does not care about the legal concepts, but if some time has
elapsed before the institution of the suit, he might be very con-
cerned whether the one-year tort prescription applies. This
confusion has existed for some time and is reflected both in the
jurisprudence and in the doctrine. 7 Where the law is clear and
free from ambiguity, it is unnecessary and erroneous to create
doubt and confusion.' If liability rests on the basis of article
2315, it is a tort matter; if based on article 667, it is a property
matter. To say that liability is based on both articles at the same
time is confusion.19
Civil Code article 667 appears under the chapter heading
"Of Servitudes Imposed by Law." It is sometimes referred to
as the sic utere2o servitude and constitutes a limitation on an
owner's use of his property in the interest of neighboring prop-
erty. For a long time it was overlooked. Then it was brought
into use as the direct basis for imposing liability without fault2 '
as an incident of property ownership. This in turn was em-
bellished by the theory that the violation of the duty set out by
article 667 constituted "fault" within the meaning of article
2315.22 The idea is ingenious but quite unnecessary. The lan-
guage of article 667 is clear and its location in the Code classi-
fication is specific. A tendency always to equate an action for
damages with tort is obviously wrong because damages can be
claimed for breach of contract (even if due to negligence), for
failure to live up to responsibilities of care for other people's
property (as in deposit or agency as well as with tutors and
administrators), and so forth. The liability for damages caused
by the violation of a servitude is part of a' property relationship
and not a matter of torts.
16. 180 So. 2d at 34.
17. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40
TUL. L. REV. 701, 708-10 (1966).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 13 (1870).
19. See clear statement of the distinction in Hanemann v. Deep South Dis-
mantling Co., 185 So. 2d 81, 82 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). See also Klein v.
Highway Department, 175 So. 2d 454, 457 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) : "A cause
of action under Civil Code article 667 is neither ex delicto nor ex contractu but
is a form of strict liability."
20. "Sic utere tuo ut alienant non laedas."
21. Devoke v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816
(1947), and comments in 8 LA. L. REV. 234, 236 (1948).
22. See cases cited at 180 So. 2d 30, 34. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana,
17 TuL. L. REV. 159, 211 (1942).
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CONVENTIONAL SERVITUDES
All conventional servitudes can be acquired by title or by
judgment,2 but only those servitudes which are continuous and
apparent can be acquired by prescription or by destination.24
Accordingly, the critical issue in a particular fact situation may
be the classification of the servitude involved. Such a problem
arose in the case of Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v.
Broussard,25 where the parties agreed that a servitude of aque-
duct for irrigation purposes was apparent but centered their
dispute on whether it was continuous or discontinuous.2 6 Al-
though the aqueduct involved some initial construction by the
act of man, and its operation required the manual opening of
gates from the main canal, the water flowed by gravity alone
through the aqueduct and for this reason the court classified
the servitude as continuous. 27
REMEDY FOR SERVITUDE VIOLATION
If suit is instituted before the servitude violation takes place,
the contemplated action can be prevented.28 However, after the
violation has already taken place, there may sometimes be a
question as to the remedy. If the violation cannot be undone,
the only recourse is in damages; but if the violation can be
stopped or removed, it is not always clear whether the violation
should be undone and discontinued, or whether compensatory
damages is a sufficient remedy. As a general rule, the common
law doctrine of "balancing of equities" is inapplicable; however,
there have been instances in which a similar approach has been
used to award damages instead of an injunction.2 In the case of
Kaffie v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co.,30 a joint driveway had been
properly established by agreement of the adjacent proprietors,
and one of them built a second-story projection on his house
thereby obstructing the neighbor's use of the driveway. The
23. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 766, 770 (1870).
24. Id. arts. 765, 767.
25. 175 So 2d 856 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) ; see also later opinion in same
case, 185 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
26. LA. CIvIL CODE arts. 727, 728 (1870).
27. For further discussion of this case and additional problems involved, see
Dainow, Planiol Citations in Louisiana Cases: 1959-1966, 27 LA. L. REV. 231
(1967) ; and Note, 40 TUL. L. REv. 397 (1966).
28. See LA. CIvIL CODE art. 856 et seq. (1870) and LA. CODE OF CIvIL PRO-
CEDURE art. 3601 et seq.
29. Adams v. Town of Ruston, 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688 (1940); Busby v.
International Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. La. 1951).
30. 184 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
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construction was quite expensive, but the agreement was per-
fectly clear; and the right of passage must be reestablished to
meet the reasonable necessities of the plaintiff unless the de-
fendant could supply an "equally convenient" alternative within
the permitted scope of Civil Code article 777.31
BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The nature and interpretation of building restrictions are
always going to increase; and since each new situation has to
be decided on the particular facts of the case, there is inevitably
going to be continued litigation to obtain the necessary decisions.
Accordingly, it is of interest to note that in Metry Club Gardens
Asso. v. Newman 2 it was held that air conditioning compressors
and the concrete slabs on which they rested were not "buildings"
within the scope of a covenant restricting their location to at
least ten feet from the property line; nor were they "garages
or other outbuildings" within the requirement to "correspond
in style and architecture to the main building." It may be dis-
concerting and ungainlYl to have the neighbor's compressor right
up against the property line but, in order to avoid it, the express
language in building restrictions will have to be more specific.
As pointed out in the principal case, restrictive covenants are in
derogation of the free use of property and are therefore given a
stricti juris interpretation. 3"
DEDICATION
In Deville v. City of Oakdale,3 4 the failure of a recorded plat
of a new subdivision to meet some of the formal requirements
of statutory dedication 5 or to contain an express dedication of
streets, did not prevent their dedication from being effective in
31. LA. CIVIL CODE art: 777 (1870) : "The owner of the estate which owes the
servitude can do nothing., tending to diminish its use, or to make it more incon-
venient.
"Thus he can not 'change the condition of the premises, nor transfer the
exercise of the servitude to a place different from that on which it was assigned
in the first instance.
"Yet if this primitive assignment has become more burdensome to the owner
of the estate which owes the servitude, or if he is thereby prevented from making
advantageous repairs on his estate, he may offer to the owner of the other estate
a place equally convenient for the exercise of his rights, and the owner of the
estate to which the servitude is due can not refuse it."
32. 182 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
33. Id. at 714.
34. 180 So. 2d 556 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
35. LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950).
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accordance with the recorded plat. 0 However, the actual open-
ing of the streets by the municipality is not a "ministerial duty
required by law" and, in the absence of any abuse of discretion
in the refusal to open any of these streets, mandamus does not
lie to force such action. 37
In Jefferson Parish School Board v. Assets Realization Co., 8
there was a resolution which formally dedicated "all streets,
avenues, highways, drives, drainage canal areas, and etc., as
shown hereon." The fact that the plat contained a square marked
"Reserved for Schools" was held not sufficient to show a de-
liberate intent to dedicate because it was also consistent with
the possibility of sale or other transfer for school purposes.
However, there was enough difference in Best Oil Co. v. Parish
Council of the Parish of East Baton Rouge39 for the court to
find an unequivocal intent to dedicate a drainage canal area in
accordance with its location on a map.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTS
Form
It now seems to be the generally accepted rule that an olo-
graphic will dated in the slash form which is uncertain as to
the day, month, or year' is invalid, and that no extrinsic evi-
dence is admissible to resolve the uncertainty.2 This rule was
36. No mention is made of the Supreme Court decision to the same effect:
Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839, 174 So. 2d 798 (1965), and comments
in 26 LA. L. REv. 467-68 (1966).
37. LA. ConE OF CrVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3861 et seq. (1960).
38. 182 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
39. 176 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), writ refused, 248 La. 365, 178
So.2d 656 (1965).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. It must be conceded that there is no uncertainty in a slash date such as
12/12/60, 8/8/60, 9/13/60. whether the first date is 12 December or December
"12, makes no difference. The same applies to the second illustration. As to the
third, it can only mean September 13th, for there are only 12 months in the year.
As to the century, see Succession of Kron, 172 La. 666, 135 So. 19 (1931).
2. For a critical review of the jurisprudence on this question see Successions
of Gaudin, 98 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) ; 140 So. 2d 384 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962), noted and discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
[Vol. XXVII
